

Political Science 290F:
Political Behavior in the Developing World

Instructor: Lauren Young

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Seminar Time: Tues 3:10-6pm

Seminar Location: Kerr 594

Office: Kerr 665

Office Hours: Monday 3-5pm. Please sign up at www.calendly.com/leyoung to reserve a specific time slot. Group sign-ups are encouraged. You're also welcome to drop in without an appointment during office hours if the calendar is free. If you have a question related to course material, for the best feedback please email it 24 hours in advance. If you'd like to discuss an assignment or your own research in depth, you'll get the best feedback if you email me a memo or draft at least five days in advance. For longer discussions, feel free to sign up for back-to-back 15-minute slots.

Overview

This course is designed to prepare advanced graduate students to do research on political behavior in the developing world. The primary goal of the course is to provide an overview of the literature on a handful of areas of active research on violence, protest, clientelism, identity and cooperation, and political participation. Class discussions are organized around questions such as, *Why do individuals participate in violence? When do citizens mobilize to demand public services from politicians?* and *How do historical events shape current behavior?* For each research area, we will read a mix of foundational texts and recent research that demonstrates how innovative research design can shed new light on foundational questions in comparative politics.

In addition to providing an overview of some substantive topics, this course aims to provide insights on how to launch new empirical research projects in comparative political behavior. To this end, we will 1) have guest speaker(s) who will discuss how they designed and implemented research projects as graduate students on 1-2 of the topics covered, 2) replicate and extend the analysis of a research paper, and 3) write and workshop a short research proposal. The goal of these exercises and one focus of the class discussions will be to go "behind the scenes" of research on the topics covered.

This course is designed for graduate students who have already taken an overview comparative politics seminar and have basic training in research design and methods. The replication assignment in particular assumes an ability to read and write code in a program like Stata or R. *If you want to take the course but have not already taken the CP seminar Political Science 242 (or a similar overview) and the methods sequence Political Science 211-213, please come talk to me.*

Assignments

The assignments in this class are designed with two goals in mind:

1. To support mastery of the substantive material – both theoretical and empirical – in the course.
2. To prepare students to be members of an academic community.

Particularly with #2 in mind, these assignments are structured around things that most academic social scientists do regularly throughout their careers.

Assignments should be posted on the course website by the start of class on the day that they are due. Late assignments will be docked 1/3 of a letter grade for each 24 hours that they are late.

Assignment #1: Critical Reviews

Deadline: 24 hours before the start of the class session when the article will be discussed.

Each participant will write a total of two critical reviews (3-5 pages each) on the weekly reading assignments. During the first day of class students will sign up for weeks to review. These critical reviews do not need to cover all of the material assigned during the week, but they must provide a critical analysis of the literature and advance an argument.

Assignment #2: Replication and Extension Exercise

Deadline: by the beginning of class on 10/24.

Replication is part of the scientific process, a great way to build familiarity with data analysis, and a potential path to a new research project. In this course, you will work in pairs to replicate and extend a published or draft working paper that uses quantitative data. The replication should cover an assessment of the basic replicability of the paper with reproduced results, as well as a section extending the analysis. This extension may apply new specifications or methods, test additional observable implications, merge in additional data, etc.

There are two ways to complete this assignment:

- Option A: The first option is to replicate a published paper. Papers covered in the course that are good candidates for replication are marked with two asterisks (**). However, you can also identify another paper on a relevant topic and obtain the data through either the public replication materials or by contacting the author(s). *If you choose to do a paper from outside the reading list, you must get prior*

- approval.* At the end of the assignment you will submit a written report on the replication along with your replication code.
- Option B: The second option is to replicate one of the papers during a guest session. In this case you will replicate a working paper by our guest and present your replication and extension to the class and our guest. *If you choose this option, you must meet with me in advance to go over your plan for the presentation.*

I expect all students in the class to be able to use data analysis tools like Stata or R. If you anticipate that you might have problems completing this assignment, come speak to me after the first class session on 10/3.

Resources on replications:

- Macartan Humphreys' [tips](#) on how to be a good discussant/reviewer
- Michael Clemens on defining replication vs. extension and "[the meaning of failed replications](#)"
- Nicholas Eubank's [replication summary report](#) of BJPS articles and tips for replicability
- Some mass replication efforts in [psychology](#) and [experimental economics](#)

Assignment #3: Research Proposal

Deadline: final proposal due by midnight on 12/5. Proposal outline due by 11/21. Presentations in class on 11/28.

Your final project is a 10-15 page proposal for a research project on a topic related to the course material. This should include: a literature review, short theoretical discussion that generates observable implications, and a proposed methodology. If time permits, you can also include a draft data collection instrument or coding protocol and preliminary analysis of actual or simulated data, but these are not required.

Before you submit this final proposal, you'll have an opportunity to get feedback from your peers and an instructor on a rough draft and in-class presentation on 11/28. In order to get feedback, you must post a rough draft of your proposal by 11/21. This can be in outline form, but it must contain all the sections for the final paper (literature review, theoretical framework with observable implications, and proposed methodology). During the class session on 11/28 you'll give a short overview of your proposal, and receive comments from the group. The draft and discussion will not be graded.

Grading

Final grades will be calculated based on:

Critical reviews – 15% each
Replication – 20%
Research proposal – 30%
In-class participation – 20%

Critical discussion of research is an integral part of what we do as academics (as well as many non-academic roles related to political science). Practicing this skill is thus an important part of professional development as well as a great way to master the material. To reflect this, 20% of grades will be based on participation in class. Preparing for class is a good way to ensure a good participation grade. Outlining material and coming to class with a list of questions and comments are both great ways to prepare, and these notes will continue to be useful as you study for comps and do your own later research and teaching.

Good writing is important for publishing, so please make sure to edit and proof read carefully so that there are no typos or bad grammar in your writing. Written assignments should have a clear structure and language should be precise. Please include page numbers.

If you are having any problems with the course, please come talk to me. Similarly, if you need to turn in something late, let me know in advance.

Sessions

10/3 – Behavioral models

What theoretical frameworks can we apply to understand political behavior? What are their assumptions? What kind of macro-level theorizing do they enable?

Required:

Shepsle and Bonchek. 1997. *Analyzing Politics: Rationality, Behavior and Institutions*. Chapters 8-9: pp197-259. [63pp]

Fehr, Ernst, and Urs Fischbacher. 2003. "The Nature of Human Altruism." *Nature* 425(6960): pp785–91. [7pp]

Camerer, Colin. 2003. "Prospect theory in the wild." In Camerer, Loewenstein, and Rabin. 2006. *Advances in Behavioral Economics*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 148-161. [14pp]

Lerner, Jennifer S., Ye Li, Piercarlo Valdesolo, and Karim S. Kassam. 2015. "Emotion and decision making." *Annual Review of Psychology* 66: pp799-823. [25pp]

Wedeen, Lisa. 2002. "Conceptualizing Culture: Possibilities for Political Science." *APSR* 96(4), pp713-728. [16pp]

Recommended:

Olson, Mancur. 1965. *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups*, Harvard Economic Studies. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Fehr, Ernst, and Simon Gächter. "Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity." *The Journal of Economic Perspectives* 14, no. 3 (2000): 159–81.

Henrich, Joseph, Robert Boyd, Samuel Bowles, Colin Camerer, Ernst Fehr, and Herbert Gintis. 2004. "Foundations of Human Sociality: Economic Experiments and Ethnographic Evidence from Fifteen Small-Scale Societies." Oxford University Press.

Swidler, Anne. 1986. "Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies." *American Sociological Review*.

Tversky, Amos, and Daniel Kahneman. 1990. Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions. In *The Limits of Rationality* edited by K. Cook and M. Levi Chicago: Chicago University Press.

March and Olsen. 1994. "New Institutionalism: Organization Factors in Political Life." *APSR*.

Mullainathan, Sendhil. 2007. "Psychology and Development Economics." In Diamond P, Vartiainen H Yrjö Jahnsson Foundation 50th Anniversary Conference on Economic Institutions and Behavioral Economics. Princeton University Press.

Tversky, Amos, and Daniel T. Kahneman. 1974. "Heuristics and Biases: Judgment under Uncertainty." *Science* 185: pp. 1124-1131.

10/10 – Identity and cooperation

How does identity shape cooperation? When is it a cleavage for conflict?

Required:

Habyarimana, James, Macartan Humphreys, Daniel Posner, and Jeremy Weinstein. 2007. "Why Does Ethnic Diversity Undermine Public Goods Provision? An Experimental Approach." *APSR* 101(4): pp709-725. [17pp]

Lieberman, Evan. 2007. "Ethnic politics, risk, and policy-making: A cross-national statistical analysis of government responses to HIV/AIDS." *CPS*, 40(12): 1407–1432. [26pp]

Chandra, Kanchan. 2006. "Counting heads." In *Patrons, Clients and Policies: Patterns of Democratic Accountability and Political Competition*, eds. Kitschelt, Herbert, and Steven I. Wilkinson. [26pp]

Wilkinson, Steven I. 2004. *Votes and Violence: Electoral Competition and Ethnic Riots in India*. Chapters 1-2. [62pp]

Petersen, Roger. 2002. *Understanding Ethnic Violence: Fear, Hatred, and Resentment in Twentieth-Century Eastern Europe*. Chapters 1-2. [84pp]

Recommended:

Hale, Henry. 2004. "Explaining ethnicity." *CPS* 37(4): pp. 458-485.

Horowitz, Donald. 2001. *The Deadly Ethnic Riot*. Chapters 1, 13.

Anthony D. Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, ch. 1-3.

Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, ch. 1-4, 7-8.

Laitin, David. 1998. *Identity in Formation: The Russian-Speaking Population in the Near Abroad*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Darden, Keith, and Anna Gryzmala-Busse. 2006. "The great divide: Literacy, nationalism, and the Communist collapse." *World Politics*. Bowles, Samuel, and Herbert Gintis. 2004. "Persistent parochialism: Trust and exclusion in ethnic networks." *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization* 55: pp. 1-23.

Tajfel, Henri. 1982. "Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations." *Annual Review of Psychology* 33: 1-39.

Alesina, Alberto, Reza Baqir, and William Easterly. 1999. "Public Goods and Ethnic Divisions." *QJE*, 114(4): pp. 1243-1284.

Posner, Daniel. 2005. *Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa*.

Posner, Daniel. 2003. "The Political Salience of Cultural Difference: Why Chewas and Tumbukas are Allies in Zambia and Adversaries in Malawi." *World Politics*.

Fearon, James, and David Laitin. 1996. "Explaining interethnic cooperation." *APSR*.

**Dunning, Thad, and Lauren Harrison. 2010. "Cross-cutting Cleavages and Ethnic Voting: An Experimental Study of Cousinage in Mali." *APSR* 104(1).

**Ichino, Nahomi, and Noah Nathan. 2013. "Crossing the line: Local ethnic geography and voting in Ghana." *APSR* 107(2): 344-361.

10/17 – Violence

Why do people participate in violence?

Required:

Humphreys, Macartan, and Jeremy Weinstein. 2008. "Who fights? The determinants of participation in civil war." *AJPS* 52(2): pp. 436-455. [20pp]

**Dube, Oeindrila, and Juan Vargas. 2012. "Commodity Price Shocks and Civil Conflict: Evidence from Colombia" *Review of Economic Studies*, 80(4): pp. 1384–1421. [38pp]

**Yanagizawa-Drott, David. 2014. "Propaganda and conflict: Evidence from the Rwandan genocide." *QJE*, 129(4): pp. 1947-1994. [48pp]

**Blattman, Christopher, Julian C. Jamison, and Margaret Sheridan. 2017. "Reducing crime and violence: Experimental evidence from cognitive behavioral therapy in Liberia." *AER* 107(4): pp. 1165-1206. [42pp]

Recommended:

Gurr, Ted R. 1970. *Why Men Rebel*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, Chapter 2.

J.C. Scott. 1977. *The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Popkin, Samuel. 1978. *The Rational Peasant*.

Lichbach, Mark I. 1998. *The rebel's dilemma*. Ann Arbor: U of Michigan Press.

James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin. 2003. "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War." *APSR*, 97(1): pp. 75–90.

Weinstein, Jeremy M. 2005. "Resources and the Information Problem in Rebel Recruitment." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49: pp. 598–624.

Jeremy Weinstein. 2007. *Inside Rebellion*. Cambridge University Press.

****Bazzi, Samuel, and Christopher Blattman. 2014. "Economic Shocks and Conflict: Evidence from Commodity Prices." *American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics*, 6(4): pp1-38.**

****Heller, Sara B., Anuj K. Shah, Jonathan Guryan, Jens Ludwig, Sendhil Mullainathan, and Harold A. Pollack. 2017. "Thinking, fast and slow? Some field experiments to reduce crime and dropout in Chicago." *QJE*, 132(1): pp. 1-54.**

ALL REPLICATION EXERCISES DUE BY THE START OF CLASS ON 10/24

10/24 – Taxation and redistribution

When are rich citizens willing to pay taxes? When do poor citizens demand redistribution? Does taxation affect political participation?

****Special guest session: Pavithra Suryanaryan. For this session, we will spend 90 minutes on the Kasara and Suryanarayan paper. Dr. Suryanarayan will come to discuss the project, and two students will replicate the paper and present the replication in class.****

Scheve, Kenneth, and David Stasavage. 2006. "Religion and preferences for social insurance." *QJPS*, 1(3): pp. 255-286.

Shayo, Moses. 2009. "A model of social identity with an application to political economy: Nation, class, and redistribution." *APSR*, 103(2): pp. 147-174.

Berens, Sarah, and Armin von Schiller. 2017. "Taxing higher incomes: What makes the high-income earners consent to more progressive taxation in Latin America?" *Political Behavior* 39(3): pp. 703-729. [27pp]

****Kasara, Kimuli and Pavithra Suryanarayan. 2015. "When do the rich vote less than the poor and why?: Explaining turnout inequality across the world." *AJPS* 59(3): pp. 613-627. [14 pp.]**

Martin, Lucy. 2016. "Taxation, loss aversion, and accountability: Theory and experimental evidence for taxation's effect on citizen behavior." Working paper.

Recommended:

Meltzer, Alan H., & Richard, Scott F. 1981. "A rational theory of the size of government." *JPE* 89(5): pp. 914-927.

Levi, Margaret. 1989. *Of Rule and Revenue*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Moore, Mick. 2004. "Revenues, state formation, and the quality of governance in developing countries." *International Political Science Review* 25(3): pp. 297-319.

Kasara, Kimuli. 2007. "Tax me if you can." *APSR* 101(1): pp. 159-172.

Lupu, Noam and Jonas Pontusson. 2011. "The Structure of Inequality and the Politics of Redistribution." *APSR* 105(2): pp. 316-336.

Keefer, Philip, and Razvan Vlaicu. 2007. "Democracy, Credibility, and Clientelism." *JLEO*, 24(2): pp. 371-406.

Huber, Evelyne, Thomas Mustillo, and John D. Stephens. 2008. "Politics and social spending in Latin America." *JOP* 70(2): pp. 420-436.

Mares, Isabela, and Matthew Carnes. 2009. "Social policy in developing countries." *ARPS* 12: pp. 93-113.

Albertus, Michael. 2013. "Explaining patterns of redistribution under autocracy: The case of Peru's revolution from above." *Latin American Research Review* 50(2): pp. 107-134.

Lu, Xiaobo, and Kenneth Scheve. 2016. "Self-centered inequity aversion and the mass politics of taxation." *CPS*, 49(14): pp. 1965-1997.

Rueda, David, and Daniel Stegmeuller. 2016. "The externalities of inequality: Fear of crime and preferences for redistribution in Western Europe." *AJPS* 60(2): pp. 472-489.

Margalit, Yotam. 2013. "Explaining social policy preferences: Evidence from the Great Recession." *APSR* 107(1): pp. 80-103.

Kasara, Kimuli, and Pavithra Suryanarayan. 2017. "Bureaucratic capacity and class voting: Evidence from across the world and the U.S." Working paper.

10/31 – Political participation and accountability

When do citizens participate in elections? How does participation vary across types of political systems? When do citizens punish corruption?

Required:

Downs, Anthony. 1957. *An Economic Theory of Democracy*. "Chapter 3: The Basic Logic of Voting." pp. 36-50. [14pp]

Lieberman, Evan S., Daniel N. Posner, and Lily L. Tsai. 2014. "Does information lead to more active citizenship? Evidence from an education intervention in rural Kenya." *World Development* 60: pp. 69-83. [14pp]

**McClendon, Gwyneth, and Rachel Beatty Riedl. 2015. "Religion as a Stimulant of Political Participation: Experimental Evidence from Nairobi, Kenya." *JOP*, 77(4): pp. 1045-1057. [13pp]

**Croke, Kevin, Guy Grossman, Horacio Larreguy, and John Marshall. 2016. "Deliberate disengagement: How education can decrease political participation in electoral authoritarian regimes." *APSR* 110(3): pp. 579-600. [32pp]

Tsai, Lily. 2007. "Solidary Groups, Informal Accountability, and Local Public Goods Provision in Rural China." *APSR* 101(2): pp. 355-372. [23pp]

Recommended:

Ferraz, Claudio, and Frederico Finan. 2008. "Exposing corrupt politicians: the effects of Brazil's publicly released audits on electoral outcomes." *QJE* 123(2): pp. 703-745.

Bjorkman, Martina, and Jakob Svensson. 2009. "Power to the people: Evidence from a randomized field experiment on community-based monitoring in Uganda." *QJE* 124(2): pp. 735-769.

Campbell, David E. 2013. "Social Networks and Political Participation." *ARPS* 16: pp. 33-48.

Daron Acemoglu, James A. Robinson and Ragnar Torvik. 2012. "Why Do Voters Dismantle Checks and Balances?" *Review of Economic Studies*, 80(3): pp. 845-875.

Gine, Xavier & Mansuri, Ghazala, 2011. "Together we will: experimental evidence on female voting behavior in Pakistan." World Bank Policy Research Working Paper Series 5692.

Finkel, Steven E. 2002. "Civic Education and the Mobilization of Participation in Developing Democracies." *JOP* 64: 994-1020.

Putnam, Robert. D. 1993. *Making Democracy Work. Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*, Princeton, Princeton University Press.

**Gerber, Alan S., Donald P. Green, and Christopher W. Larimer. 2008. "Social Pressure and Voter Turnout: Evidence from a Large-Scale Field Experiment." *APSR* 102: 33-48.

Fowler, James H., and Cindy D. Kam. 2007. "Beyond the Self: Social Identity, Altruism, and Political Participation." *JOP* 69(3): pp. 813–27.

Valentino Nicholas A., Brader Ted, Groenendyk Eric W., Gregorowicz Krysha, Hutchings Vincent L. 2011. "Election Night's Alright for Fighting: The Role of Emotions in Political Participation." *JOP* 73(1): 156–70.

11/7 – Clientelism

How do personal incentives shape vote choice? When do voters punish clientelistic candidates?

Required:

Stokes, Susan. 2005. "Perverse Accountability: A Formal Model of Machine Politics with Evidence from Argentina." *APSR* 99(3): pp. 315-325. [11pp]

**Nichter, Simeon. 2008. "Vote buying or turnout buying? Machine politics and the secret ballot." *APSR* 102(1): pp. 19-31. [13pp]

**Finan, Frederico S., and Laura Schechter. 2012. "Vote-buying and reciprocity." *Econometrica*, 80(2): pp. 863-881. [18pp]

**Gottlieb, Jessica. 2017. "Explaining Variation in Broker Strategies: A Lab-in-the-Field Experiment in Senegal." *CPS* 50(11): pp. 1556-1592. [37pp]

**Baldwin, Katherine. 2013. "Why Vote with the Chief? Political Connections and the Performance of Representatives in Zambia." *AJPS* 57(4): pp. 794-809. [15 pp.]

**Kramon, Eric. 2016. "Electoral Handouts as Information: Explaining Unmonitored Vote Buying." *World Politics*, 68(3): pp. 454-498. [44 pp.]

Recommended:

Lande, C. H., Schmidt, S. W., Guasti, L., Landé, C. H., & Scott, J. 1977. *Friends, followers and factions: A reader in political clientelism*.

Kitschelt, Herbert, and Steven I. Wilkinson, eds. *Patrons, clients and policies: Patterns of democratic accountability and political competition*. Cambridge University Press, 2007.

Gans-Morse, Jordan, Sebastian Mazzuca, and Simeon Nichter. 2014. "Varieties of clientelism: Machine politics during elections." *AJPS* 58(2): pp. 415-432.

Stokes, Susan C., Thad Dunning, Marcelo Nazareno, and Valeria Brusco. 2013. *Brokers, voters, and clientelism: The puzzle of distributive politics*. Cambridge University Press.

Larreguy, Horacio Alejandro. 2012. "Monitoring political brokers: Evidence from clientelistic networks in Mexico."

Gonzalez-Ocantos, Ezequiel, Chad Kiewiet De Jonge, Carlos Meléndez, Javier Osorio, and David W. Nickerson. 2012. "Vote buying and social desirability bias: Experimental evidence from Nicaragua." *AJPS* 56(1): pp. 202-217.

Cruz, Cesi. 2017. "Social networks and the targeting of vote buying." *Working paper*, UBC. https://www.cesicruz.com/s/Cruz_Networks_VoteBuying-x63f.pdf.

11/14 – Protest

Why do citizens participate in protest? When is protest likely to occur?

Required:

Kuran, Timur. 1991. "Now Out of Never: The Element of Surprise in the East European Revolution of 1989." *World Politics*, 44(1): pp. 7–48. [42pp]

**Young, Lauren. 2017. "The psychology of political risk under autocracy." Working paper. http://www.laurenelyssayoung.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/Young_PsychPolRisk_Paper.pdf. [35pp]

Cantoni, Davide, David Y. Yang, Noam Yuchtman, and Y. Jane Zhang. May 2017. "Protests as Strategic Games: Experimental Evidence from Hong Kong's Democracy Movement." Working paper. http://www.davidecantoni.net/pdfs/hk_protest_experiment_20170523.pdf. [52pp]

McClendon, Gwyneth H. 2014. "Social esteem and participation in contentious politics: A field experiment at an LGBT pride rally." *AJPS* 58(2): pp. 279-290. [22pp]

Pearlman, Wendy. 2016. "Moral identity and protest cascades in Syria." *BJPS*, pp. 1-25. [26pp]

Recommended:

Siegel, David A. 2009. "Social networks and collective action." *AJPS* 53(1): pp. 122–138.

Mark Granovetter. 1978. "Threshold Models of Collective Behavior." *American Journal of Sociology* 83(6): pp. 1420–1443.

Lohmann, Susanne. 1994. "The Dynamics of Informational Cascades: The Monday Demonstrations in Leipzig, East Germany, 1989-91." *World Politics* 47 (1): 42–101.

Aytac, S. Erdem, Luis Schiumerini, and Susan Stokes. 2017. "Protests and Repression in New Democracies." *Perspectives on Politics* 15(1): pp. 62-82.

Aytaç, Selim Erdem, Schiumerini, Luis, and Stokes, Susan. 2017. "Why Do People Join Backlash Protests? Lessons from Turkey." *JCR*.

Scacco, Alexandra. 2010. *Who riots? Explaining individual participation in ethnic violence*. Columbia University: PhD dissertation. Introduction and Theory: pp. 1-62.

Pearlman, Wendy. 2016. "Narratives of fear in Syria." *Perspectives on Politics* 14(1): pp. 21-37.

11/21 – Historical legacies and behavior

How does the past shape current behavior?

Required:

Wittenberg, Jason. 2015. "Conceptualizing Historical Legacies." *East European Politics & Societies* 29(2): pp. 366-378. [23pp]

**Nunn, Nathan, and Leonard Wantchekon. 2011. "The Slave Trade and the Origins of Mistrust in Africa." *AER* 101(7): pp. 3221-3252. [32pp]

Peisakhin, Leonid, and Noam Lupu. "The Legacy of Political Violence Across Generations." Forthcoming, *AJPS*. [16pp]

**Voors, Maarten J., Eleonora E. M. Nillesen, Philip Verwimp, Erwin H. Bulte, Robert Lensink, and Daan P. Van Soest. 2012. "Violent conflict and behavior: a field experiment in Burundi." *AER* 102(2): pp. 941-964. [24pp]

**Jha, Saumitra, and Steven Wilkinson. 2012. "Does Combat Experience Foster Organizational Skill? Evidence from Ethnic Cleansing during the Partition of South Asia." *APSR* 106(4): pp. 883-907. [25pp]

Recommended:

Bellows, John, and Edward Miguel. 2009. "War and local collective action in Sierra Leone." *JPE* 93(11): pp. 1144-1157.

**Melissa Dell. 2010. "The persistent effects of Peru's mining *mita*." *Econometrica* 78(6): pp. 1863-1903.

**Blattman, Christopher. 2009. "From Violence to Voting: War and political participation in Uganda." *APSR* 103(2): pp. 231-247.

Cecchi, Francesco, and Jan Duchoslav. 2017. "The effect of prenatal stress on cooperation: Evidence from violent conflict in Uganda." *Working paper, Wageningen University*.

https://www.dropbox.com/s/cquhwtxahvb6i7z/Cecchi_Duchoslav_Prenatal_Trauma_and_Cooperation.pdf?dl=0.

Garcia-Ponce, Omar. 2017. "Women's political participation after civil war: Evidence from Peru." *Working paper, UC Davis*. http://omargarciaponce.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/shining_path.pdf.

Bauer, Michael, Christopher Blattman, Julie Chytilová, Joseph Henrich, Edward Miguel, and Tamar Mitts. 2016. "Can war foster cooperation?" *JEP* 30(3): pp. 249-274.

11/28 – Research proposal presentations

FINAL RESEARCH PROPOSALS DUE 12/5