Appendix (Not For Publication)

A Data Construction Appendix

In this Appendix we provide an overview of how we constructed these datasets and describe the source and construction of each variable. The core of our dataset is a linkage between families, the firms they own, and the products that they import into Haiti. To this base, we draw in additional information on the political and social histories of Haitian families, as well as the characteristics of products. Figure A.2 provides an overview of our data structure.

[Figure A.1 about here.]

[Figure A.2 about here.]

We first link families to firms (link a in Figure A.2) with three databases of contemporary firm ownership. The first, a commercial dataset called Orbis produced by the Bureau van Dijk corporation, has information on 626 unique families that own 345 Haitian corporations; however, the majority of these are not importing firms.[8] The second is a database of Haitian firms assembled by a nonprofit organization called Haiti Building Markets after the 2010 earthquake to encourage aid agencies to buy goods and services from local firms.[9] This data includes information on more than 3,400 firms owned by 1,951 unique families. Third, we draw on information in an online database of firms registered with the Haitian Ministry of Commerce and Industry.[10] In a few cases, when a firm did not appear in any of these databases but is a major importer of a staple good in Haiti, we also use public information on the web or the knowledge of experts on Haiti's import sector. We conducted this additional research for all of the firms that import one of the 18 products on which we have consumer price data, if the owners were not identified in one of the three existing databases. From these four sources, we constructed a table of which families owned each firm that appears in our data.

[8] Accessed through a Columbia University Library portal at `https://orbis.bvdinfo.com/version-2014812/home.serv?product=orbisneo`.

[9] Accessed at `http://haiti.buildingmarkets.org/en_af/supplier-search`.

[10] Accessed at `http://registre.mci.gouv.ht/`.

The second key link in our data is from firms to products (link b in Figure A.2). To make this link, we use data on shipping patterns by firm in 2009 and 2011 provided by AGEMAR, a Haitian shipping firm that collects and sells data from the port authority. We exclude the year of 2010 because the catastrophic earthquake that hit Port-au-Prince in January 2010 dramatically changed shipping patterns by shocking demand, changing the most common suppliers of many goods (in particular, causing an influx of goods imported by NGOs), and destroying the primary Haitian port. We also exclude the bottom 10% of firms importing each product to ease the matching process and to exclude tiny or one-off shipments of goods. Using the 2009 and 2011 data, we construct a measure of the portion of trade in each good that is controlled by specific firms. Each of our products is ultimately identified by a four-digit Harmonized System (HS) code.

In later robustness checks in Appendix D.3 we test whether our results are robust to down-weighting data for products that have lower levels of consistency in shipments between 2009 and 2011.

Linking the two datasets involves merging by firm name. To accurately match firms across multiple sources, we use a combination of approximate string matching and manual identification of alternative spellings. We first strip out some words and standardize spelling, including accents on French words, and common terms.[11] We also eliminate NGOs using a combination of key word search (ex. firm names that include "foundation") and manual identification (ex. large, well-known NGOs such as "World Vision"). Next we strip out individuals only shipping items for personal use, marked by a special tariff code. After this first round of processing, we implement an approximate string matching algorithm across all the firm names with more than eight letters to match firms with a generalized Levenshtein edit distance of two or lower. Last, we identify a number of alternative spellings manually.

From this base, we merge in additional data at the level of the family and product. Our unit of analysis for the family data is the last name, which we take to represent a family dynasty. Our data on the social structure is taken from the *Association Généalogique d'Haïti*, a nonprofit

[11] For example, "shpg" becomes "shipping", and words like "S.A.", the abbreviation of "societé anonyme", a type of Haitian corporation, are stripped.

effort to collect genealogical data from Haitian and American archives and the personal records of Haitian families run by a business leader in Haiti.[12] We use the Collective Genealogy of Haitian Families, which includes information on more than 64000 individual members of Haitian families beginning in the 17th century. We restrict this data to cohorts born between 1850 and 1975 to ensure that our measure of the social network is relevant, and also show robustness to earlier cohorts. We collapse the genealogical data into a network of marriage links between families.

We also draw in data on the history of political and military service of each family, as well as the date and country of immigration for families that immigrated to Haiti after independence in 1804, using data collected by Daniel Supplice. This researcher and politician published a *Dictionnaire biographique des personnalités politiques de la République d'Haïti* that includes dictionary entries for all known individuals who held political office in Haiti, from executives to citizens who served single terms in constituent assemblies or were rewarded with titles of nobility during the 19th century. We coded all of the entries of Supplice (2001) and then restricted this data to individuals who served prior to the end of the Duvalier regime in 1986 in the executive, legislative, or judicial branch.[13] From this, we created binary variables for whether any member of a family served in any of the three main branches of government, and whether any member of a family held a commanding role in the military between 1804 and 1986. Political histories are linked to our other family-level data by last name (link d in Figure A.2).

Immigration histories are coded from another of Supplice's books and also linked by last name (link e in Figure A.2) (Supplice, 2009). This 750-page tome notes the date of naturalization and country of origin of foreign immigrants who took Haitian nationality after independence. We coded it to create an indicator variable noting whether a family immigrated to Haiti from a foreign country post-independence, and whether they immigrated from a Middle Eastern country including Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, or Egypt. Haitians reclaiming Haitian nationality after marriages to foreigners or being stripped of their nationality are not coded as immigrants.

In addition to this family-level data, we also use data at the level of the product. Product

[12] Accessible at `http://www.agh.qc.ca/`.

[13] We excluded the categories of nobility, constituent assembly, party leadership, and "other", which often denoted voluntary or unofficial positions.

information is linked to our product data by four-digit HS Code or six-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes. We use the HS-SIC crosswalk developed by Pierce and Schott (2009) as a base for merging information by SIC and HS codes (Pierce and Schott, 2009). For data that does not include HS or SIC codes, we match text product descriptions based on a combination of an exact match to a key word, approximate string matching among the possible matches, and hand matching the most common products by volume and value.

Our primary source of price data comes from the *Institut Haïtien des Statistiques et Information* (IHSI), the Haitian statistical bureau. IHSI publishes a monthly price bulletin that includes individual prices of around 20 of the top goods in the Haitian consumption basket that go into the consumer price index. We link the text descriptions of these products to 4-digit HS Codes with the help of the Office of the *Direction des Statistiques* in the *Administration Generale des Douanes*, or Haitian customs bureau. We exclude goods like public transportation fees, water provisions, and manufactured textiles that are typically not imported. This data ultimately includes monthly consumer prices of 18 goods from 2001 to 2012.

We also include product-level data on trade flows from two primary sources: first, information by product on the volume of trade between Haiti and the rest of the world collected by the Haitian shipping firm AGEMAR. As mentioned above, this data is used to link products to specific Haitian firms. Second, we draw in information on goods traded between the U.S. and Haiti from the international trade database maintained by the U.S. Census Bureau. We use this information on trade flows to construct measures of supply prices of goods traded between the U.S. and Haiti, and the U.S. and the rest of the world. Our measures are indexed to August 2004 and standardized to ease interpretation.

We also draw in information on product characteristics that may shape the incentives of firm owners to put a sympathetic autocrat in power. First, we proxy for the inelasticity of demand, which affects the extent to which monopolists could increase their profits by raising prices, using the share of the average Haitian's consumption that goods make up. Under constant elasticity of substitution preferences, consumption share and demand elasticity are inversely related. We measure consumption share using household expenditure data collected by Jensen, Johnson and Stampley (1990). Other research has shown that elite resistance to democracy is shaped in part

by the ease with which a democratic government can tax and redistribute assets (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006). We draw from this insight, plus the literature on corruption, to identify characteristics that might make certain imported goods easier for the government to effectively tax. First, we use data from PIERS to construct measures of the bulkiness and divisibility of each product to test the prediction that products that are harder to move or easier to divide should be easier to informally tax. Divisibility is measured as units per twenty-foot equivalent unit (TEU), while bulkiness is measured as value per TEU to test the prediction that bulkier products, which may be easier to identify and tax, should be associated with more resistance to democracy. Second, we merge our products with existing product-level datasets of product complexity from (Hausmann et al., 2013), time sensitivity from (Hummels, 2007), and scope for quality differentiation from Rauch (1999). These measures will be used as controls for the differential vulnerability to tariffs based on specific-skills, high discount rates, and custom agent discretion.

From this linkage, we construct two primary datasets: family-level and product-level. In our family data, we aggregate the product characteristics up to the level of the family (for families who are involved in importing more than one product) by calculating a weighted sum based on the value of a family's trade in each product. This weighted sum takes into account the price and volume of the trade by each firm that the family owns as well as the number of other owners. Thus, our measure of product-level data by family is determined by:

$$x_i = \frac{\sum_{j=1}\sum_{k=1} \frac{value_{jk}}{nown_j} x_k}{\sum_{j=1}\sum_{k=1} \frac{value_{jk}}{nown_j}}$$

where i represents each unique family in our family-level dataset, j represents each business that they own, and k represents each product that they import. In this formula x_k is the value of the product characteristic such as divisibility for each product k and x_i is the average product characteristic for each family.

For our product-level data, we aggregate family-level characteristics up to the level of the firm using a similar weighted measure that takes into account the share of trade in each product

that is owned by a particular family. Again, this takes into account the share of imports controlled by a firm and the number of families that own each firm. In this way, we calculate measures of the proportion of firm owners who participated in the 1991 coup and the average network centrality by product.

$$x_k = \frac{\sum_{j=1} \sum_{i=1} \frac{value_{ij}}{nown_j} x_i}{\sum_{j=1} \sum_{i=1} \frac{value_{ij}}{nown_j}}$$

where i again represents each family, j each firm, and k each product. In this case, because values are calculated using a monthly, product-level price, using the value or weight of each good results in the same product-level average. Ultimately the product-level values take into account the share of imports controlled by each firm and the share of each firm controlled by a particular family.

Last, for our analysis of the impact of autocracy on the general welfare, we use data on child health outcomes from the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) conducted in Haiti in 1995, 2000, 2006, and 2012. This data covers all children under five whose anthropometric data on height and weight was measured during the DHS from the onset of democracy in 1991 through 2012. This information is not linked to the rest of our data.

A.1 Summary Statistics

Family data summary statistics

Tables A.1 and A.2 show the means and standard deviations of the variables in our family datasets for all elites and our importer subsample, respectively. In the all elite sample, we include any family that has ever held political office or a high military rank, or that shows up in our business ownership data. In the importer subsample, we include only families that can be matched to companies that show up in our imports data.

[Table A.1 about here.]

In the all elite sample, coup participators are slightly more likely to be every type of elite:

business, political, and military. They are more likely to be immigrants and they are more likely to be immigrants from the Middle East. They are more central in the marriage network, and have a higher degree. They also tend to have larger families and slightly lower quality genealogical data.

[Table A.2 about here.]

The importer sample exhibits similar patterns. Coup participators are more likely to be immigrants, both from the Middle East and in general. They are more likely to have past political and military elites in their families. Their weighted Bonacich centrality and degree is higher, and they have larger families and lower reachability.

Table A.2 also shows summary statistics on product characteristics of coup participators vs. non-participators. Their average market share is similar to that of non-participators, but the total value of trade of participators in our 2009 and 2011 trade data is higher: $19.05 million for coup participators and $13.42 million for non-participators. [14] There are no meaningful differences across any product characteristics.

A.2 Determinants of Centrality

Table A.3 examines the correlates of centrality. We regress family centrality on a variety of covariates to examine possible sources of endogeneity. As per our model, we use a measure of centrality in which nodes are weighted by the value of their business interests, and we also weight edges by family size to take into account the fact that larger families have more opportunities to form marriage ties. Within the sample of all elite families in Columns 1 and 2, centrality is correlated with being from a family that immigrated to Haiti during the 20th century, and even more so if that family immigrated from the Middle East. Business elites are also more central. In the importer only sample in Columns 3-6, in addition to a family's immigration history, the value of their contemporary imports is positively related to centrality, as are some product characteristics. Specifically, central families are more likely to import products that

[14] The value of trade is calculated using prices from the U.S. Census Bureau and quantities from the AGEMAR data.

are more time sensitive, less bulky, and less divisible. Importantly, characteristics that might independently predict coup participation, such as being a military or political elite, seem to be uncorrelated with centrality. Nonetheless, we will control for all covariates in our specifications

[Table A.3 about here.]

Product data summary statistics

[Table A.4 about here.]

DHS data summary statistics

[Table A.5 about here.]

Table A.5 shows that children born during autocracy and democracy are roughly equally urban and female. Children born during autocracy are on average younger at the time of the DHS survey. This is a function of the timing of the DHS, as children are weighed and measured by DHS enumerators at four different points in time in our panel, making it important to control carefully for age in our specification. Last, children born during autocracy are shorter and lighter than their democratic peers. Our measure of the weight-for-age and height-for-age Z-scores are multiplied by 100, so a value of -100 means that a child is one standard deviation below the global reference mean.

B Model Appendix

To complete the development of the model in the text we now present the value functions for the players when the political state is a dictatorship. Let's now consider the payoffs to citizens first.

$$
\begin{aligned}
& V^c\left(N \mid a\left(N\right), a\left(D\right), \tau(D)\right) \qquad (15)\\
= & \max_{\tau(N)\geq 1} \left\{ p\left(a(N)\right)\left(W^c(\tau(N)) + \beta V^c\left(N \mid a\left(N\right), a\left(D\right), \tau(D)\right)\right)\right.\\
& \left. + \left(1 - p\left(a(N)\right)\right)\left(W^c(\tau(D)) + \beta V^c\left(D \mid a\left(N\right), a\left(D\right), \tau(D)\right)\right)\right\},
\end{aligned}
$$

We can now write the value function for a member of the elite as

$$
\begin{aligned}
& V^e\left(N \mid a^{-e}\left(D\right), a^{-e}\left(N\right), \tau(D), \tau(N)\right) \qquad (16)\\
= & \max_{a_e(N)\in[0,1]} \left\{ -\chi(a_e) + p\left(a_e, a^{-e}(N)\right) \times \right.\\
& \left[\sum_{m=1}^{M} w_{em}\left(\tau_m(N) - 1\right) q_m \kappa - \mathbf{1}_{e\in\mathscr{R}} \frac{\tau(N)^2}{2\left|\mathscr{R}\right|} \right.\\
& \left. \left. + \beta V^e\left(N \mid a^{-e}\left(D\right), a^{-e}\left(N\right), \tau(D), \tau(N)\right)\right]\right.\\
& \left. + \left(1 - p\left(a_e, a^{-e}(N)\right)\right) \beta V^e\left(D \mid a^{-e}\left(D\right), a^{-e}\left(N\right), \tau(D), \tau(N)\right)\right\}.
\end{aligned}
$$

The important point about (16) is that the decision problem facing members of the elite who are trying to gain control over the tax rate and preserve dictatorship is identical to that they face when they are trying to overthrow democracy in the first place. This implies that the optimal action vectors are the same because the costs and the 'prize' is the same.

C Robustness checks: Coup participation

C.1 Methodology to determine weighting parameter

To determine the appropriate weighting parameter, we regress coup participation on the number of connections that a family has to coup participators. The coefficient on this measure of coup degree is the appropriate weighting parameter $\frac{1}{\delta}$ to calculate Bonacich centrality in the entire network. Table C.1 shows the results of this analysis.

[Table C.1 about here.]

C.2 Robustness to alternative periods of the network data

In this section we test whether our results are robust to stricter temporal cutoffs. One source of concern in our analysis is that reverse causality could be driving our results if families that participate in the coup are more likely to marry into each other post-coup. Using older versions of the network data that are more likely to temporally predate the coup mitigates against the risk of such reverse causality. The specifications presented in each column of Table C.2 have the same controls as the corresponding specifications in Table 1. Panel A of Table C.2 presents the results from the main table. Panel B presents results using a version of the network that is truncated at cohorts born in 1950, and Panel C truncates the network at cohorts born in 1925.

[Table C.2 about here.]

C.3 Robustness to weighting by measures of data quality

One source of noise in our data comes from misattribution of families with the same last name to family dynasties. We have interpreted all individuals with the same last name as members of the same dynasty. However, in some cases common names can be shared across families. In the following table we weight the degree to which individuals with the same last name can reach each other in the sub-graph consisting of only that last name.

To examine robustness to the possibility that last names are not capturing family dynasties, we calculate an additional statistic using the subgraph of individuals that share a last name as a measure of data quality, which we call reachability. Reachability is the probability that an individual with a certain last name is connected through some path of marriage or parentage to another individual with the same last name. We calculate this probability for each node in a last-name subgraph and then take the average across all nodes in the subgraph to get a family reachability. Reachability is a good measure of the quality of our network data because it picks up two types of measurement error in the social network: first, if there are two separate family dynasties in Haiti that share the same last name but are not actually connected by kinship. Second, if we are missing marriage links between some individuals due to missing data.

A dynasty with reachability of less than one could be due to our misattribution of two families with the same last name to the same dynasty, or it could be due to missing links in our network data. In either case, it introduces measurement error. Figures C.1a and C.1b show examples of dynasties with high and low measures of reachability. These two figures use data from actual families in our database that have the same number of individual members but differ in their reachability. The size of the nodes shows the cohort of each individual, with smaller nodes indicating earlier family members. Links represent parent-child relationships.

Figures C.1c and C.1d show the distribution of reachability in our sample of all elites and our importer sample.

[Figure C.1 about here.]

We deal with this measurement error by testing whether our coefficients are robust to least squares regression weighted by the quality of the network data, as measured by each family's reachability score. Table C.3 shows the results of this analysis. In this table, we use the standardized weighted Bonacich centrality with $\frac{1}{\delta} = 0.2$ as our independent variable of interest and an adjacency matrix that takes into account the size of each family.

[Table C.3 about here.]

Table C.3 shows that the relationship between centrality and coup participation is similar in magnitude and more significant once we take variation in data quality into account.

C.4 Robustness to varying weights in centrality calculation

We also assess the robustness of our results to various ways of calculating centrality. As discussed in Section 6.1, our main results are based on a measure of centrality that is calculated using weights for both the nodes and the edges. Our theory implies that an agent's action should be increasing in his Bonacich centrality, where nodes are weighted by the profits that the agent would make during autocracy. To take into account the fact that the probability of a link between two families is also a function of the number of members in each family, we down-weight large families by also weighting the network edges by the inverse of the product of each family's size, $\frac{1}{size_e * size_m^{\frac{1}{2}}}$. In this section we recreate our analysis of the determinants of coup participation in Table 1 using various alternative node and edge weights to calculate centrality. Table C.4 presents the coefficients on the centrality measure from regressions that also include all of the controls from the corresponding specifications in Table 1.

[Table C.4 about here.]

The coefficients presented here are on the measure of centrality calculated by varying the node and edge weights. The first results presented are our original results, with node weight based on the value of a families trade calculated using prices in 2002 and edge weights based on the inverse of the product of the sizes of the connected families. The second row of results present the coefficient on centrality calculated with no node or edge weights. The third and fourth row vary the node weights by calculating the value of a family's trade using the average prices between 2002 and 2012, or during the autocratic period from March 2004 to January 2006, respectively. The final set of results replace the edge weights based on the product of the two family sizes with the inverse sum.

Table C.4 shows that the results on centrality are quite similar in magnitude, and in most cases remain significant, when we vary the node and edge weights used to calculate centrality.

D Robustness Checks: Prices

D.1 Serial Correlation

Our preferred specification includes four lags of the dependent variable. These lags are necessary to take into account dynamic processes in prices, but under some circumstances they can also raise difficulties in estimation. In this section we discuss these potential estimation problems and present the results of empirical tests of our additional assumptions.

One concern when estimating models with both fixed effects and lagged dependent variables is Nickell bias (Nickell, 1981; Alvarez and Arellano, 2003). However, this bias decreases as the number of time periods in a model go up: Judson and Owen (1999) show using simulations that this bias is around 1% when $T = 30$, so in our case with around 140 time periods it will be negligible. An alternative is to use the standard GMM estimators that are consistent in the presence of a lagged dependent variable, but these become biased for large T as they will run into the “many instruments" problem, as the instruments increase with T^2, leading to a worst case of 19600 instruments with only 2250 observations. This can be overcome by restricting the number of moments used in the estimation which we do in Table D.2. Again results are consistent than our main OLS specification.

Models with lagged dependent variables can also be biased if the lagged dependent variable is a unit root. In these cases, the sampling distributions of the coefficients are not normal. To test for whether our time series has a unit root, we test for whether the linear combination of the lags is equal to one. The lags in columns 2-5 of Table 2 add up to 0.96 (with only one lag), 0.946, 0.945, and 0.944, respectively. The coefficients from tests of whether the linear combination of the coefficients on the lagged dependent variables equal one are all significant at the 1% level, which means that we can reject the null hypothesis that there is a unit root in all four of the specifications in Columns 2-5 of Table 2.

Last, we test whether our coefficient of interest is robust to assuming autocorrelation parameters between 0.9 and 1. Assuming an autocorrelation coefficient eliminates the threat of bias that exists in the specifications where we estimate both the autocorrelation and our coefficient of interest. In Table D.1 we test whether our preferred specification of Column 5 in Table 2 is

robust to autocorrelation coefficients in this range of parameters around our estimated getting increasingly close to 1.

[Table D.1 about here.]

Table D.1 shows that the estimate of the coefficient of interest on $Coup_i \times Autocracy_t$ remains statistically significant up to an imposed autocorrelation of 1 (equivalent using the price growth rates as the dependent variable). This is well above our estimated autocorrelation of around 0.945. At an imposed autocorrelation of 0.95, our estimated coefficient of 0.016 is statistically indistinguishable from the result of 0.015 reported in Column 5 of our main Table 2.

[Table D.2 about here.]

D.2 Robustness to inclusion of product controls

Table D.3 tests whether the price regressions shown above are robust to including the interactions of product characteristics and autocracy.

[Table D.3 about here.]

Table D.3 shows that the effect of coup participation during autocratic periods is robust to including three of five product characteristics, in addition to the product-level measures of Consumption Share and Number of Firms, interacted with Autocracy. There are no robust relationships between the product characteristics and prices during autocracy.

D.3 Robustness to weights for data quality

We also run a test to estimate the sensitivity of our results to non-random missingness in our data. There are three kinds of missingness that we are most worried about. First, there is non-random missingness in our data on which firms import which products. Specifically, for each product we have data on the firm that imports around 90% of the volume of trade. Missingness is concentrated in products that are imported in bulk such as sugar, kerosene, rice, and edible oil.

Second, there is non-random missingness in the extent to which we could identify the families that own each firm. For our CPI products, we are able to identify on average 64-65% of the importing families by quantity, weight or value of imports. Generally, we are less able to identify the owners of firms that import less, so missingness tends to be higher for products with lower market concentration such as sandals, furniture, and beauty care. Though this means that we have non-random measurement error it also suggests that we are able to identify a higher proportion of large and influential importers, who we find are the most likely to participate in coups. Last, we may have measurement error in the extent to which our data from 2009 and 2011 represents shipping historical shipping patterns in Haiti, which we were unable to obtain. As a measure of this potential error, we calculate the volume of shipments by shipper in 2009 that also occurred in 2011.

We use a series of regressions in which we weight observations by these measures of data quality to test the sensitivity of our results to these data limitations. Table D.4 shows the results of an analysis of the relationship between prices during autocracy and coup participation using weights based on our measures of data quality. Each of these weights is a measure that varies between 0 and 1 and is calculated at the product level.

[Table D.4 about here.]

Table D.4 shows that our results are generally stronger when we weight the data by measures of our confidence in its quality. Column 1 presents the results from our preferred specification in our original table of results, Table 2, without any weights. Column 2 presents this same specification estimated using weighted OLS with the proportion of the volume of trade in each product where we identified the family as the weight. The coefficient in this specification is slightly smaller in magnitude but more significance than in the original specification. Column 3 presents the results using the proportion of firms that we were able to identify in each product as the weight. The coefficient on Coup $\times$ Autocracy is slightly smaller than in Column 1 but still significant at the 5% level. In Column 4 we use a weighted specification where the weights are the proportion of firm-product trade in 2009 that is also imported in 2011. In this specification, the coefficient increases in magnitude to 0.023 and gains in significance. In the last column,

we use a "combined weight" that is the product of the three weights in columns 2-4. Again, the coefficient on Coup $\times$ Autocracy is larger in magnitude once we take our measures of data quality into account and significant at the 5% level.

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Table A.1: Summary Statistics: Family-level data - All elite sample

		Coup			Non-coup		
		N	Mean	St. Dev.	N	Mean	St. Dev.
Social	Political elite	212	0.71	0.45	828	0.62	0.49
	Military elite	212	0.42	0.49	828	0.29	0.45
	Business elite	212	0.43	0.50	828	0.34	0.47
	Immigrant	212	0.22	0.42	828	0.08	0.27
	Middle Eastern	212	0.10	0.31	828	0.02	0.15
	Bonacich centrality	202	56.87	164.79	514	25.52	71.95
	Degree	202	19.23	21.89	514	13.54	16.55
	Family size	202	25.38	29.78	514	18.84	24.73
	Reachability	202	0.35	0.27	514	0.53	0.30

Table A.2: Summary Statistics: Family-level data - Importer sample

		Coup			Non-coup		
		N	Mean	St. Dev.	N	Mean	St. Dev.
Social	Immigrant	76	0.38	0.49	225	0.17	0.38
	Middle Eastern	76	0.22	0.42	225	0.08	0.27
	Political elite	76	0.46	0.50	225	0.21	0.41
	Military elite	76	0.24	0.43	225	0.08	0.28
	Bonacich centrality	73	150.86	248.50	144	81.94	118.53
	Degree	73	26.37	29.59	144	16.60	19.81
	Family size	73	33.93	39.41	144	22.18	27.87
	Reachability	73	0.36	0.28	144	0.57	0.30
Economic	Market share	76	0.07	0.11	225	0.08	0.12
	Value (mil USD)	76	16.31	47.95	225	7.89	21.89
	Consumption share	52	0.46	0.63	131	0.37	0.56
	All inputs	76	0.87	0.28	225	0.87	0.27
	Bulkiness	76	3.62	2.99	225	3.98	2.83
	Divisibility	76	4.90	2.23	225	4.98	2.20
	Reference price	76	1.32	0.55	225	1.25	0.53
	Time sensitivity	76	0.00	0.01	225	0.00	0.01
	Complexity	76	1.66	1.69	225	1.72	1.77

Table A.3: Determinants of Centrality

	Dependent variable: Centrality					
	Centrality					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Middle Eastern	0.32**	0.33**	0.29	0.31*	0.20	0.22
	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.16)	(0.15)
Immigrant	0.08**	0.08*	0.21**	0.19**	0.20**	0.19**
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Reachability	0.04	0.04	0.10	0.11	0.14	0.11
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Military	−0.01	−0.01	0.01	−0.01	−0.05	−0.09
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.08)
Political	−0.01	−0.01	0.07	0.05	0.03	0.04
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)
Business	0.15***	0.15***				
	(0.02)	(0.02)				
Family Size (Log)		0.01		0.03	0.02	0.02
		(0.01)		(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Business Value (Mil USD)					0.005***	0.004***
					(0.001)	(0.001)
Consumption Share						0.01
						(0.02)
All Inputs						−0.05
						(0.11)
Reference Price						−0.03
						(0.02)
Complexity						0.02
						(0.03)
Time Sensitivity						0.04**
						(0.02)
Bulkiness						−0.06**
						(0.02)
Divisibility						−0.06**
						(0.03)
Constant	−0.79***	−0.81***	−0.69***	−0.79***	−0.82***	−0.83***
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.11)
Observations	716	716	217	217	217	217
R^2	0.23	0.23	0.14	0.15	0.31	0.37
Sample	All Elite			Importers		

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

The outcome variable is the standardized weighted Bonacich centrality of a family in the marriage network where the parameter $\frac{1}{\delta}$ is set to 0.02. The adjacency matrix used to calculate centrality is weighted by the number of members in each family to take into account the higher propensity of large families to connect with each other and the value of a family's trade. Immigrant measures whether a family is recorded as having naturalized as a citizen after independence. Middle Eastern takes a value of 1 if the immigrant came from Lebanon, Syria, Egypt, or Palestine. Military Elite and Political Elite take a value of 1 if a member of the family held a position in government or the military between independence and the end of the Duvalier era in 1986 (Supplice, 2001). Business elite takes a value of 1 if a member of the family is an owner in our business database. The social distance measures are calculated using data on the marriage network from the *Association Genéalogique d'Haïti*. The measure of a family's interest in autocracy is the total value of each family's trade in the AGEMAR trade data. Models are estimated using OLS.

Table A.4: Summary Statistics: Product data

Product	Firms	Fams	Coup	Cent.	Middle Eastern	Share Consumption
	N			Weighted Mean		Percent
Beauty care	56	42	0.57	11.00	0.81	0.20
Bread	18	14	0.58	10.82	0.83	0.53
Chicken	12	9	0.92	3.15	0.92	0.22
Cigarettes	2	6	1.00	8.77	1.00	0.37
Cola	12	17	0.69	4.82	0.60	0.16
Corn meal	6	6	0.66	3.97	0.36	0.45
Dry peas	5	6	0.55	13.55	0.88	0.00
Edible oil	5	10	0.43	6.08	1.00	3.10
Evaporated milk	10	12	0.49	14.83	0.59	0.38
Fabric	23	15	0.52	7.89	0.67	1.15
Fresh fish	10	7	0.42	9.55	0.67	1.28
Furniture	19	19	0.38	11.10	0.63	0.01
Kerosene	5	3	0.76	7.65	1.00	0.85
Laundry soap	24	19	0.35	7.42	0.81	0.00
Medicine	11	12	0.31	5.10	0.50	0.73
Raw sugar	8	6	0.70	7.35	0.85	0.51
Rice	7	6	0.88	5.51	1.00	2.26
Sandals	23	7	0.65	0.63	0.00	0.00

Table A.5: Summary Statistics: Child health outcomes data

	Democracy			Autocracy		
	N	Mean	St. Dev.	N	Mean	St. Dev.
Urban	11643	0.3	0.5	3207	0.4	0.5
Female	11643	0.5	0.5	3207	0.5	0.5
Age	11643	29.9	17.0	3207	16.5	10.7
Weight (tenths kg)	11482	114.6	35.4	3034	89.5	35.6
Height (tenths cm)	11469	842.7	139.5	3026	734.5	104.8
Weight (Z-score)	11229	-90.3	122.8	2893	-102.8	139.5
Height (Z-score)	11229	-102.3	137.3	2893	-112.7	146.7

Table C.1: Centrality in the Network of Coup Participators

	(1)	(2)
Coup Degree	0.229**	0.253*
	(0.089)	(0.146)
Observations	716	217
R^2	0.011	0.015
Sample	All elite	Importers

Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
The outcome variable is a binary measure of whether a family participated in the coup, as measured by whether the family is on the 1991 U.S. Treasury targeted sanctions list. The measure Coup Degree is the number of connections that a family has to coup participators. Models are estimated using OLS.

Table C.2: Robustness to earlier versions of the network

	Dependent variable:									
	Coup									
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Panel A: 1850-1975 Marriage Network										
Centrality	0.213***	0.188***	0.098	0.097	0.193***	0.213***	0.221***	0.147*	0.139*	0.14*
	(0.055)	(0.054)	(0.064)	(0.063)	(0.059)	(0.067)	(0.068)	(0.075)	(0.072)	(0.072)
Observations	716	716	716	716	217	217	217	217	217	217
R^2	0.017	0.042	0.075	0.077	0.034	0.04	0.059	0.116	0.142	0.143
Panel B: 1850-1950 Marriage Network										
Centrality	0.202***	0.178***	0.08	0.081	0.175***	0.197***	0.209***	0.123	0.117	0.12
	(0.057)	(0.056)	(0.066)	(0.066)	(0.062)	(0.069)	(0.07)	(0.078)	(0.075)	(0.074)
Observations	699	699	699	699	209	209	209	209	209	209
R^2	0.014	0.04	0.078	0.08	0.027	0.032	0.048	0.114	0.139	0.14
Panel C: 1850-1925 Marriage Network										
Centrality	0.156***	0.126**	0.067	0.067	0.125**	0.153**	0.172**	0.116	0.105	0.107
	(0.053)	(0.055)	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.061)	(0.071)	(0.074)	(0.075)	(0.075)	(0.075)
Observations	659	659	659	659	191	191	191	191	191	191
R^2	0.014	0.032	0.077	0.078	0.021	0.027	0.05	0.127	0.135	0.136
Sample	All elite				Importers					

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

The outcome variable is a binary measure of whether a family participated in the coup, as measured by whether the family is on the 1991 U.S. Treasury targeted sanctions list. The measure of centrality is the standardized weighted Bonacich centrality of a family in the marriage network where the parameter $\frac{1}{\delta}$ is set to 0.02. In Panel A, the network is restricted to nodes born between 1850 and 1975, in Panel B to nodes born between 1850 and 1950, and in Panel C to nodes born between 1850 and 1925. The adjacency matrix used to calculate centrality is weighted by the number of members in each family to take into account the higher propensity of large families to connect with each other. Data quality weights are constructed using network data from all time periods and represent for each last name the average proportion of other nodes with that last name that can be reached from a single node of that last name, or the reachability within each last name across nodes. Immigrant measures whether a family is recorded as having naturalized as a citizen after independence. Middle Eastern takes a value of 1 if the immigrant came from Lebanon, Syria, Egypt, or Palestine. The measures of political eliteness Military Elite and Political Elite take a value of 1 if a member of the family held a position in government or the military between independence and the end of the Duvalier era in 1986 (Supplice, 2001). The social distance measures are calculated using data on the marriage network from the *Association Genealogique d'Haïti*. The measure of a family's interest in autocracy is the total value of each family's trade in 2009 and 2011, which is calculated from the AGEMAR trade data. Models are estimated using OLS.

Table C.3: Robustness to weights based on quality of network data

	Dependent variable:									
	Coup									
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Centrality	0.237***	0.218***	0.160**	0.160**	0.241***	0.210***	0.207***	0.158**	0.157**	0.157**
	(0.056)	(0.055)	(0.066)	(0.066)	(0.061)	(0.059)	(0.066)	(0.071)	(0.073)	(0.073)
Family Size		0.028**	0.036**	0.036**		0.056***	0.051**	0.052*	0.045*	0.045*
		(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.015)		(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)
Social Characteristics		✓	✓	✓			✓	✓	✓	✓
Economic Characteristics							✓	✓	✓	✓
Product Characteristics									✓	✓
Community FE				72						22
Observations	716	716	716	716	217	217	217	217	217	217
R^2	0.024	0.033	0.143	0.143	0.054	0.090	0.108	0.130	0.163	0.163
Sample	All elite						Importers			

Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
The outcome variable is a binary measure of whether a family participated in the coup, as measured by whether the family is on the 1991 U.S. Treasury targeted sanctions list. The measure of centrality is the standardized weighted Bonacich centrality of a family in the marriage network where the parameter $\frac{1}{\delta}$ is set to 0.02. The adjacency matrix used to calculate centrality is weighted by the number of members in each family to take into account the higher propensity of large families to connect with each other. Data quality weights are constructed using network data from all time periods and represent for each last name the average proportion of other nodes with that last name that can be reached from a single node of that last name, or the reachability within each last name across nodes. Immigrant measures whether a family is recorded as having naturalized as a citizen after independence. Middle Eastern takes a value of 1 if the immigrant came from Lebanon, Syria, Egypt, or Palestine. The measures of political eliteness Military Elite and Political Elite take a value of 1 if a member of the family held a position in government or the military between independence and the end of the Duvalier era in 1986 (Supplice, 2001). The social distance measures are calculated using data on the marriage network from the *Association Genealogique d'Haïti*. The measure of a family's interest in autocracy is the total value of each family's trade in 2009 and 2011, which is calculated from the AGEMAR trade data. The communities are calculated using the walktrap algorithm with a walk distance of 3. Models are estimated using OLS.

Table C.4: Robustness to varying node and edge weights in the centrality measure

Weights		Specification									
Nodes	Edges	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
$log(value_{2002})$	$\frac{1}{(size_e * size_m)^{\frac{1}{2}}}$	0.21***	0.19***	0.1	0.08	0.19***	0.21***	0.22***	0.15*	0.14*	0.14*
		(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.08)
None	None	-0.03*	-0.03*	-0.03	-0.03*	-0.07**	-0.08**	-0.08**	-0.06*	-0.06*	-0.06*
		(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
$log(value_{2002-12})$	$\frac{1}{(size_e * size_m)^{\frac{1}{2}}}$	0.21***	0.19***	0.1	0.08	0.19***	0.21***	0.22***	0.15*	0.14*	0.14*
		(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)
$log(value_{autocracy})$	$\frac{1}{(size_e * size_m)^{\frac{1}{2}}}$	0.21***	0.19***	0.1	0.08	0.19***	0.21***	0.22***	0.15*	0.14*	0.14*
		(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.08)
$log(price_{2002})$	$\frac{1}{(size_e * size_m)^{\frac{1}{2}}}$	0.16***	0.13***	0.09*	0.07	0.14***	0.16***	0.16***	0.13**	0.11*	0.11
		(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)
$log(value_{2002})$	$\frac{1}{(size_e + size_m)}$	0.21***	0.19***	0.1	0.08	0.19***	0.21***	0.22***	0.14*	0.14*	0.14*
		(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.08)
Observations		716	716	716	716	716	217	217	217	217	217
Sample		All elite					Importers				

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

This table presents the coefficients on centrality calculating using different node and edge weights from eight specifications (controls not shown). The outcome variable is a binary measure of whether a family participated in the coup, as measured by whether the family is on the 1991 U.S. Treasury targeted sanctions list. The measure of centrality is the standardized weighted Bonacich centrality of a family in the marriage network where the parameter $\frac{1}{\delta}$ is set to 0.2. The social controls include Family size, Immigrant, Middle Eastern, and dummies for each type of elite (Military, Political, and in the All Elite sample, Business). The product controls include the Value of trade, All Inputs, Consumption Share, Reference Price, Complexity, Divisibility, Bulkiness, and Time Sensitivity. The social distance measures are calculated using data on the marriage network from the *Association Genealogique d'Haïti*. The communities are calculated using the walktrap algorithm with a walk distance of 3. Models are estimated using OLS.

Table D.1: Robustness to imposed autocorrelation coefficients

	Imposed autocorrelation:				
	$\rho = 0.9$	$\rho = 0.925$	$\rho = 0.95$	$\rho = 0.975$	$\rho = 1$
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Coup × Autocracy	0.024***	0.021***	0.018**	0.016**	0.013
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Coup × Quake	0.077*	0.073*	0.069*	0.065	0.061
	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.040)	(0.040)
World Supply Price	0.005	0.004	0.002	0.0001	−0.002
	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Number Firms × Autocracy	−0.004	−0.004	−0.003	−0.002	−0.002
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Consumption Share × Autocracy	−0.0005	−0.0004	−0.0002	−0.0001	−0.00001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Month FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Product FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Product × Conflict Events	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	2,322	2,322	2,322	2,322	2,322
Clusters	18	18	18	18	18

Standard errors clustered at the product level in parentheses

* significant at $p < .10$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$

The dependent variable is the retail price from the Haitian statistical institute *Institut Haïtien des Statistiques et Information*. All prices are indexed to Aug 2004. In Columns 1-4, we impose an autocorrelation coefficient of 0.90, 0.925, 0.95, and 0.975, respectively. The interaction term Coup × Autocracy is the interaction between an indicator for being in an autocratic period and the proportion of the market that is controlled by families who participated in the 1991 coup, according to the US Office of Foreign Assets Control. Coup participation is calculated for each product as the average over all business owners that import that product, weighted by the value of their share of the product. The interaction term Coup × Quake is the interaction between the coup proportion and being in the month after the January 2010 earthquake. World supply price is the log world supply price of each good by month from the U.S. Census Bureau in levels. In addition to the supply price, we control for the number of firms importing a particular product from the AGEMAR trade data and the consumption share of each good from Jensen, Johnson and Stampley (1990). The unit is the product-month and observations cover January 2001 to December 2012 with some missingness. Models are estimated using OLS.

Table D.2: Robustness to GMM estimators

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Coup × Autocracy	0.0251***	0.0382**	0.0266*	0.0330*	0.0281 *
	(0.00969)	(0.0177)	(0.0158)	(0.0188)	(0.0152)
N	1278	1278	1278	1278	1278
Clusters	18	18	18	18	18
Lags of prices	4	4	4	4	4
Lags used for instruments	All Lags	Lags 1-10	Lags 2-10	Lags 1-8	Lags 2-8
Month FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Product FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Robust Standard errors in parentheses
$^{*}p < .1$, $^{**}p < .05$, $^{***}p < .01$

Table D.3: Robustness of price results to controls for product characteristics

	Dependent variable:				
	price_log				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Coup × Autocracy	0.019**	0.015**	0.018***	0.015**	0.008
	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Coup × Quake	0.068*	0.068*	0.068*	0.068*	0.068*
	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.041)
Number Firms × Autocracy	−0.0003	−0.001	−0.001	−0.001	−0.001
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Consumption Share × Autocracy	−0.003	−0.003	−0.002	−0.003	−0.002
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)
World Supply Price	−0.0005	−0.0003	−0.0004	−0.0002	−0.0003
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Bulkiness × Autocracy	0.0004			0.001	−0.001
	(0.002)			(0.002)	(0.002)
Time Sensitivity × Autocracy		−0.001		−0.001	−0.001
		(0.001)		(0.001)	(0.001)
Complexity × Autocracy			−0.001	−0.001	−0.001
			(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Divisibility × Autocracy					0.002
					(0.004)
Ref. Price × Autocracy					0.002
					(0.001)
Product × Conflict Events	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Lagged Dep. Var.	4	4	4	4	4
Month FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Product FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Clusters	18	18	18	18	18
Observations	2,214	2,214	2,214	2,214	2,214

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Standard errors clustered at the product level in parentheses

* significant at $p < .10$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$

The dependent variable is the retail price from the Haitian statistical institute *Institut Haïtien des Statistiques et Information*. All prices are indexed to Aug 2004. The interaction term Coup × Autocracy is the interaction between an indicator for being in an autocratic period and the proportion of the market that is controlled by families who participated in the 1991 coup, according to the US Office of Foreign Assets Control. Coup participation is calculated for each product as the average over all business owners that import that product, weighted by the value of their share of the product. The interaction term Coup × Quake is the interaction between the coup proportion and being in the month after the January 2010 earthquake. World supply price is the log world supply price of each good by month from the U.S. Census Bureau in levels. In addition to the supply price, we control for three other terms that affect an import firm's profits: the interaction of being in an autocratic period and the number of firms importing a particular profit from the AGEMAR trade data as well as the consumption share of each good from Jensen, Johnson and Stampley (1990). The third control is the interaction of product dummies and the number of conflict events not involving the Haitian elite from the GDELT data. The last five controls in the specification are product characteristics interacted with being in an autocratic period. The product measures Bulkiness and Divisibility are calculated from the PIERS trade data. Complexity is taken from the Hausmann et al. (2013). Reference Price is from Rauch (1999). Time Sensitivity is from Hummels (2007). The unit is the product-month and observations cover January 2001 to December 2012 with some missingness. Models are estimated using OLS.

Table D.4: Prices of goods imported by coup participators during autocratic periods using weights based on measures of data quality

	Weights:				
	None	Fams id'd (%)	Firms id'd (%)	$\frac{Import11}{Import09}$	Combined weights
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Coup × Autocracy	0.018**	0.017***	0.017**	0.025***	0.023**
	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Coup × Quake	0.068*	0.060*	0.045	0.198***	0.077*
	(0.041)	(0.033)	(0.029)	(0.058)	(0.040)
World Supply Price	−0.0004	0.002	0.002	−0.002	0.004
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Number Firms × Autocracy	−0.003	−0.003	−0.003	−0.004	−0.005
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Consumption Share × Autocracy	−0.0005	−0.001	−0.0004	−0.0002	−0.0003
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Lagged Dep. Var.	4	4	4	4	4
Month FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Product FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	2,214	2,214	2,214	2,214	2,214
Clusters	18	18	18	18	18

Standard errors clustered at the product level in parentheses

* significant at $p < .10$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$

The dependent variable is the retail price from the Haitian statistical institute *Institut Haïtien des Statistiques et Information*. All prices are indexed to Aug 2004. The interaction term Coup × Autocracy is the interaction between an indicator for being in an autocratic period and the proportion of the market that is controlled by families who participated in the 1991 coup, according to the US Office of Foreign Assets Control. Coup participation is calculated for each product as the average over all business owners that import that product, weighted by the value of their share of the product. The interaction term Coup × Quake is the interaction between the coup proportion and being in the month after the January 2010 earthquake. World supply price is the log world supply price of each good by month from the U.S. Census Bureau in levels. The unit is the product-month and observations cover January 2001 to December 2012 with some missingness. In addition to the supply price, we control for two other terms that affect an import firm's profits: the number of firms importing a particular profit from the AGEMAR trade data and the consumption share of each good from Jensen, Johnson and Stampley (1990). Both controls are logged and interacted with the Autocracy dummy. We also control for the interaction of the product dummies and the number of non-elite conflict events from the GDELT data. Models are estimated using OLS.

Figure A.1: Import quotas for 19 major families, 1984-1985 (Fass, 1990)

	SHARE OF QUOTA ALLOCATED TO IMPORTER (%)																		Total Share (%)	Total Importers
	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	
Household utensils, metal	7	92																		99	2
Household utensils, plastic	2	2	15	26	49															94	5
Shoes						70														70	1
Slippers	92																			92	1
Nails						65														65	1
V-8 juice	29							71												100	2
Vegetable and fruit juices	48							48												96	2
Toothpaste	3								62											65	2
Liquid disinfectant	11				14			14		39										78	4
Wrapping paper, cardboard	66							16												82	2
Paper and plastic bags	94																			94	1
Irons for pressing clothes		43		28			28													99	3
Paint											44	22	22							88	3
Hand soap	10		18						45											73	3
Candies	65							32												97	2
Textiles														31	12	37				80	3
Milk																	63	28		91	2
Spaghetti, macaroni, etc.	44																		56	100	2

Source: Reveco (1984).

Figure A.2: Diagram of dataset construction



Figure C.1: Examples and Distribution of Reachability in the Haitian Marriage Network

(a) Low reachability family



(b) High reachability family



(c) Histogram of reachability: All elite sample



(d) Histogram of reachability: Importer sample