

# **Appendix: Anger and Support for Punitive Justice in Mexico's Drug War**

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# Contents

<b>A</b>	<b>Sampling</b>	<b>1</b>
A.1	Sampling Design . . . . .	1
A.2	Sample Diagnostics . . . . .	2
<b>B</b>	<b>Measurement</b>	<b>4</b>
B.1	Policy preferences . . . . .	4
B.2	Psychological outcomes . . . . .	5
B.3	Controls . . . . .	5
<b>C</b>	<b>Validation of violence exposure measures</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>D</b>	<b>Study 1: Additional analyses</b>	<b>6</b>
D.1	Violence and policy preferences . . . . .	6
D.2	Violence and psychological characteristics . . . . .	8
<b>E</b>	<b>Study 2: Additional analysis</b>	<b>8</b>
E.1	Measurement . . . . .	8
E.2	Balance tests . . . . .	10
E.3	Results disaggregated by scenario . . . . .	10
<b>F</b>	<b>Study 3: Additional analysis</b>	<b>12</b>
F.1	Scenario likelihood weights . . . . .	12
F.2	Disaggregated results . . . . .	12

## A Sampling

### A.1 Sampling Design

Our target population was adults residing in Western Mexico. We took a representative sample from the four states known as Western Mexico, namely Michoacán, Colima, Jalisco, and Nayarit.

Figure A.1: States of Western Mexico



Respondents were randomly selected using a stratified multistage cluster sampling design. Our sampling design takes into account variation vigilante group presence, violence levels, and urbanization. Mexico's electoral precincts were used as the primary sampling units (PSUs). The combination of geospatial and census data at the electoral precinct level provide the most complete and up-to-date sampling frame available in the country. These data come from the National Electoral Institute (INE) and are continuously updated. Approximately 95% of Mexicans 18 years old or older are registered at the INE: as of January 2017, about 84 million voters had been registered. These citizens are dispersed across 68,364 electoral precincts.

Each PSU in the sampling frame was assigned to a non-overlapping sample stratum based on the following variables:


- **Geographical subregion.** Michoacán vs other states.
- **Type of electoral precinct.** Urban vs rural.
- **Presence of vigilante groups.** Known past vigilante presence vs. no known vigilantes.<sup>1</sup>
- **Violence levels.** High, medium, and low homicides per 100,000 people during the past year.

Within each stratum, electoral precincts were selected with probability proportional to the number of registered voters. Figure A.2 shows the sampled electoral precincts in green. Red lines demarcate municipal boundaries, and black lines denote state-level boundaries.

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<sup>1</sup>There is only one known municipality with vigilante presence outside of Michoacán, so we only stratify on vigilante presence in Michoacán.

Figure A.2: Sampled Electoral Precincts



Once electoral precincts in the sample were drawn, we randomly selected blocks (or clusters of homes) within the precinct. These are our second-stage sampling units (SSUs). In urban areas, a block is defined as a geographic space delimited by streets or avenues. In rural precincts, instead of blocks, our SSUs are defined as clusters of homes.

Within each block, households were enumerated by starting at the northeast corner and walking clockwise. Once a questionnaire is completed, the interviewer has to move to the next side of the block. Finally, once a household is selected, the interviewer conducts a short screening interview with an adult to determine if household members meet the study eligibility criteria.

## A.2 Sample Diagnostics

This strategy produced a sample with characteristics that are very similar to the demographics of Western Mexico. However, due to both design choices and implementation issues, the raw sample deviates slightly from representativeness. The sample deviates from representativeness by design because we purposely took 50% of our respondents from Michoacán, although Michoacán makes up 32% of the population of the region. During the implementation of the survey, slight deviations from representativeness arose because of variation in the availability of respondents to be surveyed. To take both of these into account, in some specifications we include sampling weights based on 1) the inverse propensity that an individual's locality was selected for the study, and 2) age and gender proportions of citizens over 18 by PSU based on the January 2017 INE registry. We use the following formula to calculate a sampling weight for each individual  $i$ :

$$w_{ijk} = \frac{1}{Pr(Z_{ik} = 1)} \times \frac{g_{ij}}{\sum_1^n g_j}$$

where  $w_{ij}$  is the sampling weight for individual  $i$  in PSU  $j$  in sampling strata  $k$ ,  $Pr(Z_{ik} = 1)$  is the probability that individual  $i$  is selected for the sample based on her residence in sampling strata


$k$ , and  $\frac{g_i}{\sum_1^n g}$  is the proportion of the adult population in PSU  $j$  that individual  $i$ 's demographic group makes up.

In this section we briefly discuss how the raw data used in most of our analyses compares to the re-weighted, representative dataset. Table A.1 presents the summary statistics for the unweighted sample (columns 2-3) and the weighted sample (columns 4-5). In general, the sample that takes into account the strata propensity weights and PSU demographic weights is slightly younger, slightly more likely to be employed and married, has slightly fewer children, and is slightly less likely to own major assets. Figure A.3 displays the histogram of respondent ages in the weighted (in blue) and unweighted (in red) samples. Most importantly, the weighted sample has a much smaller proportion of Michoacan residents (32% vs. 50%). There are no apparent differences on gender, past exposure to drug-related trauma, or emotional profiles.

Table A.1: Comparison of unweighted and weighted sample summary statistics

	Unweighted		Weighted		N
	Mean	Std. Error	Mean	Std. Error	
Age	43.64	0.48	40.10	0.49	1205
Female	0.56	0.01	0.57	0.01	1205
Married	0.53	0.01	0.49	0.01	1205
Kids	2.54	0.07	2.27	0.07	1205
Employed (Household Head)	0.33	0.01	0.38	0.01	1170
Education	3.30	0.05	3.48	0.05	1199
Home Owner	0.57	0.01	0.55	0.01	1190
Assets: Refrigerator	0.91	0.01	0.92	0.01	1178
Assets: Washing Machine	0.76	0.01	0.77	0.01	1177
Assets: Cellphone	0.80	0.01	0.82	0.01	1176
Assets: Smartphone	0.43	0.01	0.49	0.01	1169
Assets: Computer	0.26	0.01	0.30	0.01	1174
Trauma: Seen armed men	0.29	0.01	0.29	0.01	1199
Trauma: Extortion	0.14	0.01	0.13	0.01	1202
Trauma: Confined to home	0.27	0.01	0.25	0.01	1202
Michoacan	0.50	0.01	0.32	0.01	1205
Colima	0.04	0.01	0.05	0.01	1205
Jalisco	0.40	0.01	0.55	0.01	1205
Nayarit	0.06	0.01	0.08	0.01	1205
Fear	0.74	0.03	0.73	0.03	1195
Nervousness	0.94	0.03	0.89	0.03	1199
Anger	1.04	0.03	1.07	0.03	1198
Indignation	0.76	0.03	0.74	0.03	1194
Happiness	2.29	0.03	2.35	0.02	1191
Cheerfulness	2.16	0.03	2.20	0.03	1190
Sadness	0.88	0.03	0.82	0.03	1196
Dejection	0.79	0.03	0.77	0.03	1190

Figure A.3: Comparison of unweighted and weighted age histograms



## B Measurement

### B.1 Policy preferences

We construct the Policy Attitudes Index using the following five survey questions. Unless otherwise indicated, outcomes were measured on a five-point agreement scale. Individual measures were combined using the mean effects methodology described by ?. The order of the questions was randomized across respondents.

- *Support Death Penalty*: Some people have suggested that one way to stop the violence is to bring back the death penalty. Do you support or oppose this proposal?
- *Oppose Paying*: Some people have suggested that one way to stop the violence is to pay narcos to stop killing civilians. Do you support or oppose this proposal? (Reverse coded)
- *Support Lynching*: Would you rather see a criminal accused of kidnapping lynched in the town square, or tried in the court of law and go free on a technicality/small point of law? (Binary outcome, lynched = 1)
- *Support Autodefensas*: Some people believe that the autodefensas are necessary to control violence in Mexico. Do you support or oppose this view?
- *Support Armed Groups*: Some people believe that it is necessary to have armed groups outside of the government, because the police and army are not capable of protecting us. Do you agree or disagree with this belief?

The sub-indicators in the index have the following correlations:

The elements of the index are generally weakly positively correlated ( $\rho$  between 0.13 and 0.36), except in the case of Oppose Paying. The weak correlation of Oppose Paying may be because this variable is the only reverse-coded measure.

Table B.1: Policy Attitudes Index

	Support Death Penalty	Oppose Paying	Support Armed Groups	Support Autodefensas	Support Lynching
Support Death Penalty	1.00	-0.10	0.28	0.14	0.32
Oppose Paying	-0.10	1.00	-0.24	-0.20	-0.02
Support Armed Groups	0.28	-0.24	1.00	0.36	0.23
Support Autodefensas	0.14	-0.20	0.36	1.00	0.13
Support Lynching	0.32	-0.02	0.23	0.13	1.00

## B.2 Psychological outcomes

In Section 5, we also test for correlations between exposure to violence and a series of psychological outcomes. These include the emotions of anger, fear, sadness, and happiness, as well as attributions of blame and general punitiveness. In this section we describe the measures for each of these outcomes.

First, we measure respondents' propensities to feel four different emotions: anger, fear, sadness, and happiness. Each of these measures represents a standardized mean effects index of two questions measured on a standardized four-point scale in response to questions asking how often the respondent felt the emotions during the past 30 days.

The specific words used in each index were:

- Anger: angry, indignant
- Fear: afraid, nervous
- Sadness: sad, dejected
- Happiness: happy, cheerful

We measure two psychological variables that may mediate the relationship between anger and policy preferences: attributions of blame and general punitiveness. Both are also standardized mean effects indices based on the extent to which the respondent thinks that six different groups (narcotraffickers, politicians, federal police, local police, the army, and the autodefensas) are to blame for the violence affecting their municipality (Attributions of Blame), or should be punished for the violence affecting their municipality (General Punitiveness).

## B.3 Controls

Some specifications also include the following set of control variables:

- Female: a gender dummy.
- Education: a standardized measure of education on a 9-point scale.
- Assets Index: a standardized index based on the first principal component of measures of asset ownership.
- Age: a standardized measure of years of age.
- Married: a dummy variable indicating whether the respondent is married.
- Employment: a dummy variable indicating whether the household head is employed.

## C Validation of violence exposure measures

As discussed in Section 5, we measure exposure to severe violence at the individual level by asking respondents to assess how likely it is that someone in their locality had experienced five different types of violence: abduction, extortion, paying for protection, being threatened with a weapon, and assault. These five types of violence were the most extreme forms of victimization that we asked respondents about; the full list of forms of violence that we asked about was adapted from a recent application of the Harvard Trauma Questionnaire to study drug-war-affected populations in Mexico (?).

We refer to these as our indirect measures of violence because we are using respondents' assessments of their neighbors' experiences to proxy for their own personal exposure to violence. To validate these indirect measures, we compare estimates of incidence of exposure to less severe (and therefore less sensitive) forms of violence based on the indirect questions to direct questions asking about whether the respondent herself was ever exposed.<sup>2</sup> If our indirect measures are in fact picking up variation in the respondent's own experience, the direct and indirect questions should be strongly related. The forms of violence for which we have both direct and indirect measures are: extortion, seeing a narco-banner, and seeing a narco-blockade.

Table C.1 presents the results of our validation exercise. We find that the direct questions are strongly predictive of the indirect questions. The direct and indirect questions are correlated, with  $\rho$  between 0.22 and 0.4. The correlation is large in magnitude and statistically significant at the 1% level both with and without PSU fixed effects. People who are personally exposed to each of the three types of violence are between 0.56 and 1.23 standard deviations higher on the indirect exposure scales. The fact that even conditional on the neighborhood that someone is in (i.e., their PSU), there is a strong relationship between the direct and indirect measures, suggests that the indirect measures are picking up a large component of individual experience.

## D Study 1: Additional analyses

### D.1 Violence and policy preferences

Table D.1 tests whether the analysis presented in Table 1 is consistent across the questions that primarily measure a preference for harsh punishments. There is a substantively large and highly statistically significant relationship between past violence exposure and higher support for the death penalty. However, the coefficient on the question asking whether respondents oppose paying narcos to stop committing crimes is in the same direction, although it is very close to zero.

Table D.2 tests whether the analysis presented in Table 1 is consistent across the three questions that primarily measure permissive attitudes towards vigilantes. There are significant positive associations between past exposure to violence and two outcomes: support for armed groups outside of the state to fight narco-traffickers and support for lynching. The effect on the question asking about support for the autodefensas, however, is a tight null effect. One reason that the autodefensas themselves may have no more support for people who have experienced violence (despite their

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<sup>2</sup>For the direct questions, we phrased the question as follows: "For the next list of experiences, I'd like you to think back to your own experiences in the context of the war against drug trafficking. For each item, I'd like you to tell me if you have ever personally experienced it in a way that was related to drug trafficking or the drug war."



Table C.1: Validation of indirect violence exposure using direct questions

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>								
	Extortion (Indirect)			Blockade (Indirect)			Banner (Indirect)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Extortion (Direct)	0.63*** (0.08)	0.60*** (0.08)	0.54*** (0.09)						
Blockade (Direct)				1.15*** (0.08)	1.13*** (0.09)	1.06*** (0.09)			
Banner (Direct)							1.23*** (0.08)	1.22*** (0.09)	1.12*** (0.09)
Individual Controls		✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	
PSU FE			✓			✓			✓
Number of PSUs			135			135			135
Observations	1,151	1,120	1,120	1,148	1,116	1,116	1,152	1,118	1,118
R <sup>2</sup>	0.05	0.10	0.25	0.14	0.18	0.31	0.16	0.22	0.34

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Standard errors in parentheses.

Coefficients estimated using OLS. Columns 1, 4, and 7 present bivariate relationships between the direct and indirect questions. Columns 2-3, 5-6, and 8-9 include individual level controls for gender, age, an assets index, marital status, household head employment status, and the surveyor fixed effects. Columns 3, 6, and 9 include PSU (neighborhood) fixed effects.

Table D.1: Exposure to violence and criminal justice policy preferences: Preferences for harsh punishments

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Support Death Penalty			Oppose Paying		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Violence Index	0.14*** (0.03)	0.13*** (0.03)	0.13*** (0.04)	0.01 (0.03)	0.003 (0.03)	0.02 (0.04)
Individual Controls		✓	✓		✓	✓
PSU FEs			✓			✓
Number of PSUs			119			119
Observations	1,137	1,106	1,106	1,121	1,091	1,091
R <sup>2</sup>	0.02	0.05	0.18	0.0001	0.02	0.13

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Standard errors clustered by PSU in parentheses.

Coefficients are estimated using OLS with sampling weights. Violence Index is a mean effects index of exposure to five different types of severe violence, measured indirectly. Controls include gender, education, age, an assets index, marital status, employment status of the household head, and PSU fixed effects.

greater support for vigilante justice generally) may be that the autodefensas have begun to be seen as a criminal rather than vigilante group in some areas.

Table D.2: Exposure to violence and criminal justice policy preferences: Preferences for vigilantes

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>								
	Support Armed Groups			Support Autodefensas			Support Lynching		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Violence Index	0.06 (0.04)	0.05 (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)	0.0002 (0.03)	-0.003 (0.03)	-0.05 (0.04)	0.15*** (0.04)	0.15*** (0.04)	0.13*** (0.04)
Individual Controls		✓	✓		✓	✓		✓	✓
PSU FEs			✓			✓			✓
Number of PSUs			119			119			119
Observations	1,130	1,098	1,098	1,123	1,092	1,092	1,113	1,083	1,083
R <sup>2</sup>	0.003	0.01	0.15	0.0000	0.01	0.18	0.02	0.04	0.19

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Standard errors clustered by PSU in parentheses.

Coefficients are estimated using OLS with sampling weights. Violence Index is a mean effects index of exposure to five different types of severe violence, measured indirectly. Controls include gender, education, age, an assets index, marital status, employment status of the household head, and PSU fixed effects.

## D.2 Violence and psychological characteristics

In this section we look empirically at whether past exposure to violence is also associated with variation in other emotions, in addition to higher levels of anger. Table D.3 shows that there is some evidence that fear, sadness, and happiness are all also positively associated with more exposure to violence. However, only the correlation with fear is robust to the inclusion of individual-level controls and locality fixed effects. In terms of their magnitudes, the size of the association between past exposure to violence and other emotions ranges from about 5% (happiness, in the opposite direction) to about 82% (fear) of the size of anger's association. Overall, these results suggest that although past insecurity is associated with a multifaceted set of emotions, the most potent emotion in that set is anger.

Figure D.1 plot the coefficients from analyses that disaggregate the blame and punitiveness indices from Columns 4-9 of Table 2. The results of exposure to violence are substantively similar across all six actors for both blame and punitiveness.

## E Study 2: Additional analysis

### E.1 Measurement

As per our pre-analysis plan, we use the following dependent variables to test our predictions:

- Anger (Manipulation Check) - a standardized measure of how angry the respondent reports she would be if the scenario happened in her municipality on a four-point scale.

Table D.3: Exposure to violence and psychological outcomes: Alternative emotions


	<i>Dependent variable:</i>								
	Fear			Sadness			Happiness		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Violence Index	0.09*** (0.03)	0.10*** (0.03)	0.11*** (0.03)	0.06** (0.03)	0.08*** (0.03)	0.10*** (0.03)	-0.002 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)
Female		0.19*** (0.06)	0.16** (0.07)		0.08 (0.05)	0.08 (0.06)		0.01 (0.06)	0.01 (0.07)
Education		-0.05*** (0.01)	-0.05*** (0.02)		-0.07*** (0.01)	-0.06*** (0.02)		0.05*** (0.01)	0.04** (0.02)
Assets Index		0.02 (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)		-0.01 (0.03)	0.004 (0.03)		0.10*** (0.03)	0.08** (0.04)
Age		-0.001 (0.002)	-0.0004 (0.002)		0.002 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)		-0.01*** (0.002)	-0.01*** (0.002)
Married		0.001 (0.06)	-0.03 (0.06)		-0.08 (0.06)	-0.09 (0.07)		0.11** (0.05)	0.10* (0.06)
Employed		0.05 (0.06)	0.05 (0.06)		-0.01 (0.06)	0.01 (0.07)		0.02 (0.05)	0.001 (0.06)
Constant	-0.03 (0.03)	0.04 (0.12)	0.69*** (0.14)	-0.04 (0.03)	0.12 (0.11)	0.58*** (0.13)	0.07** (0.03)	0.08 (0.13)	-0.31** (0.14)
PSU FEs			✓			✓			✓
Number of PSUs			119			119			119
Observations	1,147	1,115	1,115	1,146	1,114	1,114	1,146	1,114	1,114
R <sup>2</sup>	0.01	0.04	0.15	0.005	0.04	0.15	0.0000	0.06	0.17

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Standard errors clustered by PSU in parentheses.

Coefficients are estimated using OLS. Violence Index is a mean effects index of exposure to five different types of severe violence, measured indirectly. Controls include gender, education, age, an assets index, marital status, employment status of the household head, and PSU fixed effects.

Figure D.1: Standardized coefficients from disaggregated analyses of violence, blame and punitiveness



- Fear (Alternative) - we also test whether the outrage version of the scenario affects how afraid the respondent says she would be.
- Harsh Vigilante Preferred (Predictions 3A and 3B) - whether the respondent prefers the harsh, vigilante option that we give them over a legal, more lenient punishment for the crime. We code this as a binary outcome that takes a value of 1 if the respondent chooses the harsh vigilante solution.
- Harsh Vigilante More Just (Mechanism) - part of the mechanism linking outrage to a preference for harsh vigilante punishments could be an increase in perceptions that harsh vigilante solutions are more just. We test this with a dummy variable indicating whether the respondent believes that the vigilante solution is more just.
- Harsh Vigilante More Effective (Mechanism) - similarly, part of the mechanism linking outrage to a preference for harsh vigilante punishments could be an increase in perceptions that harsh vigilante solutions are more effective in preventing future violence. We test this with a dummy variable indicating whether the respondent believes that the vigilante solution is more effective.

## E.2 Balance tests


Table E.1 presents tests of balance for all three of the moral outrage scenarios. Three out of the 72 variables show statistically significant imbalance, which is more or less what we would expect from random chance. There is no evidence that the randomization of the moral outrage scenarios was improperly implemented.

## E.3 Results disaggregated by scenario

Table E.1: Balance tests for three moral outrage scenarios

	Scenario 1			Scenario 2			Scenario 3			<i>N</i>
	Treat	Control	<i>p</i> -value	Treat	Control	<i>p</i> -value	Treat	Control	<i>p</i> -value	
Age	44.68	42.29	0.01	43.65	43.39	0.79	43.29	43.75	0.64	1169
Female	0.54	0.58	0.15	0.55	0.58	0.33	0.57	0.55	0.60	1169
Married	0.55	0.51	0.15	0.54	0.52	0.55	0.57	0.48	0.00	1169
Children	2.64	2.43	0.16	2.50	2.58	0.55	2.59	2.49	0.49	1169
Employed (HH Head)	0.30	0.35	0.09	0.34	0.30	0.15	0.32	0.33	0.87	1135
Education	3.27	3.27	0.99	3.35	3.19	0.16	3.27	3.28	0.92	1163
Home Owner	0.56	0.57	0.80	0.55	0.59	0.16	0.58	0.56	0.46	1155
Assets: Refrigerator	0.89	0.93	0.02	0.90	0.92	0.42	0.91	0.91	0.68	1144
Assets: Washing Machine	0.76	0.76	0.83	0.76	0.76	0.83	0.77	0.75	0.44	1143
Assets: Cellphone	0.80	0.81	0.63	0.81	0.80	0.54	0.81	0.80	0.86	1142
Assets: Smartphone	0.42	0.44	0.58	0.44	0.42	0.48	0.43	0.43	0.82	1135
Assets: Computer	0.25	0.26	0.58	0.26	0.25	0.62	0.26	0.25	0.78	1140
Michoacan	0.52	0.51	0.76	0.49	0.53	0.13	0.52	0.50	0.49	1169
Colima	0.03	0.05	0.22	0.04	0.04	0.73	0.03	0.05	0.24	1169
Jalisco	0.39	0.38	0.70	0.40	0.36	0.13	0.37	0.39	0.46	1169
Nayarit	0.06	0.07	0.71	0.06	0.07	0.81	0.07	0.06	0.32	1169
Fear	0.70	0.78	0.19	0.72	0.75	0.57	0.71	0.76	0.50	1160
Nervousness	0.96	0.92	0.55	0.92	0.96	0.46	0.95	0.92	0.65	1163
Anger	1.06	1.04	0.72	1.04	1.06	0.80	1.04	1.06	0.75	1162
Indignation	0.77	0.74	0.63	0.76	0.75	0.91	0.77	0.75	0.74	1158
Happiness	2.32	2.28	0.45	2.30	2.30	0.91	2.32	2.28	0.55	1155
Cheerfulness	2.17	2.15	0.74	2.21	2.12	0.10	2.17	2.16	0.82	1155
Sadness	0.87	0.89	0.67	0.83	0.93	0.07	0.87	0.90	0.62	1161
Dejection	0.84	0.76	0.19	0.76	0.84	0.18	0.77	0.83	0.38	1154

Figure E.1: Effect of disaggregated outrage scenarios on hypothetical anger and fear




## F Study 3: Additional analysis

### F.1 Scenario likelihood weights

In this section we present an analysis of the likelihood weights that we use in the analysis presented in Section 7. The purpose of these weights is to make the distribution of scenarios as close as possible to the real violence to which people in our sample are exposed. To calculate them, we asked respondents after every scenario how likely they thought it was that the scenario could take place in their community on a four-point scale. We use a specification that includes each of the individual scenario characteristics and their interactions to calculate likelihood weights for each scenario. Intuitively, what this means is that if the average respondent in our sample finds it unlikely that a soldier would rob a student (for example), that scenario would be down-weighted according to how unlikely they find this crime relative to others. This helps ensure that our estimates are based on variation that is actually relevant in the local context, making the experiment more externally valid. The full table of estimated likelihoods of the scenarios is available on request.

Figure F.1 presents the distribution of the probability weights. They range between 0.55 and 1.75. The fact that the range between the least and most likely scenarios is relatively small suggests that the scenarios that we created are generally contextually relevant.

Figure F.1: Distribution of scenario probability weights



The results of all analyses in Tables 6, 7, and 8 are substantively unchanged when they are re-estimated without these scenario probability weights. Results are available on request.

### F.2 Disaggregated results

This section presents the full results with all of the scenario categories disaggregated and presented as dummy variables for each individual category. We present coefficient plots that correspond to the

second specification in the analyses in Section 6 that includes individual control variables and PSU fixed effects.

Figure F.2: Effect of disaggregated scenario characteristics on anger




Figure F.3: Effect of disaggregated scenario characteristics on fear




Figure F.4: Effect of disaggregated scenario characteristics on preference for harsh punishments




Figure F.5: Effect of disaggregated scenario characteristics on preference for extrajudicial punishments




Figure F.6: Effect of disaggregated scenario characteristics on the rank of punitiveness




Figure F.7: Effect of disaggregated scenario characteristics on the rank of legality






Figure F.8: Effect of disaggregated scenario characteristics on the rank of effectiveness

